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Abstract I argue for a four dimensional, non-dynamical view of space-time, where
becoming is not an intrinsic property of reality. This view has many features in
common with the Parmenidean conception of the universe. I discuss some recent
objections to this position and I offer a comparison of the Parmenidean space-time
with an interpretation of Heraclitus’ thought that presents no major antagonism.
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1 Theory and reality
The aim of physical theory is to represent reality (e.g. Bunge 1967). A basic as-
sumption of science is that there are things in the world, and that things have
properties (this is an ontological hypothesis). Properties can be represented by
mathematical functions and other abstract objects invented by human beings ac-
cording to self-consistent rules (e.g. Bunge 2006). The value of the functions and
the structure of the mathematical objects of the theory are restricted by equa-
tions and mathematical conditions that represent physical laws, i.e. restrictions to
the possible space of states of things. When the properties of things change, we
say that there is an event. An event is specified by an ordered pair of states of a
thing (see Bunge 1977 and the Appendix below). Each state is characterized by a
collection of values of state functions. Of course, the characterization of a thing is
not unique. A specific model of a thing depends on those aspects of reality that
the theory concerns about. The succession of events (or processes) that occur to
a thing forms its history.
Any physical theory refers to some kind of concrete entities. The existence of
these entities is assumed by the theory. If the theory is successful, we gain con-
fidence on the existence of the entities. If the theory fails, we can consider the
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postulated entities just as exploratory hypothesis that may be abandoned. For
instance, the standard model of particle physics assumes the existence of different
kind of quantons: leptons, quarks, and interaction bosons. The existence of W±
and Z0 bosons was a working hypothesis of the electroweak interaction model till
the particles were discovered in experiments at the end of the 1970s. Now, they
are considered as real as photons. Tachyons, on the contrary, are currently discred-
ited as constituents of the world, because of both theoretical reasons and lack of
observational evidence. Other particles, like the Higgs boson, remain hypothetical
but plausible so far.
The kind of objects that physical theories assume as elements of the world can
change as our knowledge of the world evolves. From plants, animals, and planets
to elementary particles and quark stars, our view of the universe can change,
changing what we think there is, how things are, and how they relate.
2 The manifold model of space-time
General relativity is the theory of space, time and gravitation formulated by Albert
Einstein in 1915 (Einstein 1916). It is an extraordinarily successful theory that
has passed many test, both in the weak and strong field limits. It is a highly
complex theory where the gravitational field is described through the curvature
of space-time. The field equations are ten non-linear differential equations in the
coefficients of the metric tensor of space-time. The theory reaches its maximum
predictive power when expressed independently of coordinates in the language of
abstract differential geometry. In this formulation, known as the manifold model of
space-time (e.g. Hawking & Ellis 1973, Joshi 1993), the appearance of coordinate
singularities as that in Schwarzschild’s solution can be avoided. The theory can be
applied from compact objects with strong gravity to the whole universe.
The basic concept of this formulation of general relativity is the concept of
space-time, introduced by Hermann Minkowski in 1908 (Minkowski 1909). Space-
time can be defined as the ontological sum1 of all events of all things. This is
not a mere set, which is a mathematical object (i.e. a fiction), but an emergent
relational property of all things. Everything that has happened, everything that
happens, everything that will happen, is just an element of space-time.
As it is the case with every physical property, we can represent space-time with
some mathematical structure, in order to describe it. The mathematical structure
and the property represented should not be confused: the correspondence is never
perfect, it always remain tentative. The manifold model of space-time adopts the
following mathematical structure:
Space-time can be represented by a C∞ differentiable, 4-dimensional, real man-
ifold.
A real 4-D manifold is a set that can be covered completely by subsets whose
elements are in a one-to-one correspondence with subsets of <4. Every event is
represented by a point of the manifold (the converse is not necessary true). Each
1 I write ontological sum and not ‘mereological aggregation’ because I do not consider space-
time as a thing nor an individual, but as an emergent property of all changing things. See Perez
Bergliaffa et al. (1998).
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element of the manifold represents an event. We adopt 4 dimensions because it
seems enough to give 4 real numbers to localize an event (i.e. to provide a minimum
characterization). We can always provide a set of 4 real numbers for every event,
and this can be done independently of the intrinsic geometry of the manifold.
If there are more than a single characterization of an event, we can always find
a transformation law between the different coordinate systems. This is a basic
property of manifolds.
If we want to calculate distances between two events, we need more structure
on the manifold: we need a geometric structure. We can get it introducing a metric
tensor field gab to determine distances. The infinitesimal separation between two
elements of the manifold, which represent two events of space-time, is given by:
ds2 = gabdx
adxb. (1)
Space-time, then, is fully represented by an order pair (M, g), where M is the
manifold and g is the metric tensor field. In general relativity the metric of space-
time is determined by the energy-momentum of the physical systems through
the Einstein’s field equations. The metric itself then represents the gravitational
potential and its derivatives determine the equations of motion through the affine
connection of the manifold.
As it is the case of any other physical theory, the manifold model of space-time
assumes some entities that are represented mathematically. The basic assumption
here is the existence of what is represented by the points of the manifold: the
totality of events, the changes of all things (and, hence, of such things, since there
are no changes without changing things).
Since the manifold is 4 dimensional, a process, or even the whole history of
a 3-dimensional thing, can be represented by a 4-dimensional object (e.g. Heller
1990, Balashov 2010). Although human experience of change can be used to inspire
the concept of manifold, once it is adopted, we can describe space-time from a 4-
dimensional point of view, where there is no global change. Change of space-time
would require an extra dimension not included in space-time. This, in turn, would
imply that space-time is a thing with an emergent relational property that should
be measured by the extra dimension or ‘meta-time’. There is no physical reason
to introduce such an ontology. And if someone is willing to pay the price to do
it, an infinite regress follows immediately, since the 5D ‘super space-time’ might
change requiring more extra dimensions ontological inflation would turn the price
unaffordable.
Strings of changes and irreversible processes of physical things are described by
asymmetries, intrinsic features, of space-time. Dynamics is the result of comparing
different slices of space-time. The ‘present’ is not a moving thing. It is just a
concept, a class of events. All this conforms the so-called block universe ontology
(e.g. Smart 1963, Balashov 2010). This view was also expressed, rather poetically,
by Hermann Weyl (Weyl 1949):
The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze
of my consciousness, crawling upward along the life line of my body, does
a section of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which
continuously changes in time.
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3 The Parmenidean universe
Parmenides was born and lived in Elea, a town on the west cost of southern Italy,
from the end of the 6th century to the mid 5th century BC. He wrote a poem
in hexameters entitled On What Is. Almost the whole first part of the poem and
fragments of the second part have survived thanks to Simplicius, who copied part
of the text in the 6th century AD into his commentary of Aristotle’s Physics.
The first part of the poem is called The Way of Truth. This piece contains the
first known example of a deductive system applied to physical reality. Parmenides
was not content just with giving his view of the world. He supported his interpre-
tation of world by logical deduction from what he considered self-evident premises.
He stated that there is no change, no becoming, no coming to be. Reality turns
out to be unchanging, eternal, motionless, perfect, and single. There is just one
thing: the World. His monism is absolute. What we think is a changing world is
only the result of illusion and deception.
The premises of Parmenides’ argument can be written as:
– What is, is.
– What is not, is not.
Then, nothing can come to be from what is not, because ‘what is not’ is not
something. Creatio ex nihilo is nonsense. Change is impossible since, for Par-
menides, change is the occupation of empty space, but there cannot be ‘empty
space’. Reality must then be an unchanging block.
Many centuries later, with the advent of field theories it became clear that
change can occur even in a full universe: change does not require empty space. A
perturbation in a field that fills the whole universe is a change.
The concept of change is central to the manifold model of space-time. But
once the geometry of the manifold is determined by a tensor field representing
the distribution of energy and momentum, its structure is fixed. The universe is
represented by the triplet (M, g, T ), where T is the tensor field that represents
the properties (energy and momentum) of things. Points of the manifold repre-
sent events, but there is no event or change affecting the space-time as a whole.
The four dimensional space-time, mathematically represented by the manifold, is
unchanging, eternal, motionless, single, just as the Parmenidean universe. What
we call irreversible processes are described by asymmetries in the manifold. The
objects that populate the universe are 4-dimensional. They have ‘temporal parts’,
as well as spatial parts. In this way, the child I was, is just a part of a larger
being, I, that is 4-dimensional. What we call ‘birth’ and ‘death’ are just temporal
boundaries of such a being. Change appears only when we consider 3-dimensional
slices of 4-dimensional objects. In words of Max Tegmark:
Time is the fourth dimension. The passage of time is an illusion. We
have this illusion of a changing, three-dimensional world, even though noth-
ing changes in the four dimensional union of space and time of Einstein’s
relativity theory. If life were a movie, physical reality would be the entire
DVD: Future and past frames exist just as much as the present one2.
2 From an interview by Eaves (2008).
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It seems not to be unfair to call this interpretation of space-time a Parmenidean
view of the world. Parmenides, we might say, is back with a vengeance, in 4
dimensions.
4 Objections
Recently, Mario Bunge has forcibly criticized the interpretation of the manifold
model of space-time outlined above (Bunge 2011). The core of his argument is the
following:
If points in a spacetime grid are identified with events, instead of being
said to represent possible events, becoming vanishes. But this is absurd: you
are still alive, your great-grand children are not yet born, the next economic
bust is yet to come, the Sun has not yet imploded, and so on. Novelties occur
objectively all the time, even if the origin of time is conventional. Since the
neo-Parmenidean conclusion is utterly false, its premise must be false as
well. What was the premise? That spacetime points = events instead of
spacetime points represent (point) events. That is, the trouble in question
is a semantic fallacy: that of identifying the map with the territory, the
portrait with the subject, the wiring diagram with the network, the model
with its referent.
I maintain, however, that there is no semantic fallacy here. As it is clear from
the definitions given above, space-time has no ‘points’. Space-time has been defined
as an aggregation of events. It is an emergent relational property of all changing
things. The manifold, which is certainly a mathematical concept, represents space-
time, and the elements of the manifold represent events. I do not subscribe that
space-time is a thing, as the sustantivalists do (e.g. Nerlich 1994). I hold that space-
time is an emergent relational property of all material things. This is the very
same position maintained by Bunge (1977) and developed by Perez-Bergliaffa et
al. (1998), among others. The ‘portrait’ is the manifold model, the ‘subject’, space-
time, and space-time emerges from changing things. So, the ontological assumption
of the manifold model of space-time is that there are changing things, something
that Bunge probably will not deny. But space-time itself cannot change, unless
we accept a multidimensional time, with the extra dimensions not included in
space-time (see arguments against multidimensional time in Bunge 1958).
The emergence of space-time from changing basic things is also essential to
the foundations of background-independent quantum gravity (e.g. Rovelli 2004).
If things relate discontinuously, then space-time itself should display quantum
features.
Another argument used by Bunge is:
...the notion that time is just one more geometric dimension, on a par
with the other three (or seven), is false as well, as shown by the privileged
role it holds in the equations of motion. For example, Hamilton’s equation
dp/dt = −∂H/∂x has no spatial counterpart. Likewise, the boundary con-
ditions, so important in continuum mechanics and in quantum mechanics,
have no temporal counterparts.
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These statements are based on an incorrect interpretation of the manifold
model. Time is not on a par with the other dimensions, since the space-time
metric is represented by a tensor field of trace −2, not 4. The manifold is locally
Lorentzian, not Euclidean, hence it represents correctly the distinctive role of time.
A mere ‘spatialization’ of time is inconsistent with our current knowledge of nature.
Inconsistencies, moreover, can be found in the presentism advocated by Bunge: in
a universe with a finite and constant velocity for the propagation of interactions,
simultaneity is not absolute as in a Newtonian space (Einstein 1905) and past and
future of events not causally connected are relative to a reference system. This
does not mean that some events exist with respect to one system and not to other.
The constraints on what can be known from some physical reference frame are
epistemological, not ontological. Existence is invariant under general coordinate
transformation. The events that we call ‘future’ are as real as those we call ‘past’
(see, e.g., Putnam 1967).
Regarding boundary conditions, their temporal counterparts are the so-called
initial conditions. Actual boundary conditions in space-time should be fixed in 4
dimensions in order to make predictions. We should not confuse the predictive
power of our theories, with ontological determinism. The latter is a metaphysical
doctrine: the doctrine that all events exist, independently of our possibility of
knowing or predicting them. The manifold model of space-time is ontologically
deterministic, although it is compatible with epistemic indeterminacy.
It might be the case that the manifold model of space-time be ultimately
incorrect. All representations of reality are just imperfect approximations, but
the problems of the model are not semantic. They are more likely related to the
applicability of the manifold concept to represent events at the Planck scale.
5 Heraclitus’ river
It is usual to oppose Parmenides’ ideas of a changeless reality to Heraclitus’ view
that “all things flow”. Such a view, however, is not based on the extant fragments,
but on Plato’s interpretation, presented in his Cratylus (DK 22A63):
All things move and nothing remains, and likening existing things to
the flow of a river he says that you could not step twice into the same river.
The origin of this seems to be in Heraclitus’ fragment DK 22B12:
Upon those who step into the same rivers, different and different waters
flow.
In the Theaetetus, Plato goes further and attributes to Heraclitus the view
that all things are always changing in all respects. As pointed out by McKirahan
(1994), Plato is likely considering not Heraclitus’ thought, but some radical elabo-
rations made much later by Heracliteans or perhaps even by Cratylus. Heraclitus’
fragments seem to emphasize stability through change, and not a changing KOS-
MOS (κo´σµoς). Morever, a KOSMOS based only on change without stability or
HARMONIA (α`ρµoνι´α), is a contradiction in terms, a contradictio in adjecto: it
3 The notation refers to the doxography in H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der
Vorsokratiker, 6th ed., Berlin, 1951.
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would be CHAOS (χα´oς). The most important idea in the fragments is that there
is a LOGOS (λo´γoς) in the KOSMOS, a kind of general principle that applies to
everything. If we remain faithful to the extant fragments, we see that Heraclitus
states that stability is achieved by continuous change. If a river does not flow, if it
does not ‘contain’ change, it is not a river, it is a lake. It is just by changing that
the river achieves its stability. The same can be extended to all things. Fragment
DK 22B84a:
By changing it is at rest.
Heraclitus, moreover, shares some ontological and epistemological concerns
with Parmenides, as shown in DK 22B50 and DK 22B123, respectively:
Listening not to me but to the LOGOS is wise to agree that all things
are one.
Nature loves to hide.
I offer the suggestion that the ontological antagonism between Parmenides and
Heraclitus usually mentioned by so many authors is the result of a doxographic
tradition that has its origin in Plato. There is not much in Parmenides’ poem nor
in Heraclitus’ extant fragments to support a frontal opposition. The KOSMOS
(or space-time in a modern view) might be changeless and nonetheless formed by
changing things, as Heraclitus’ river.
6 Conclusion: time does not go by
I do not support the spatialization of time. I maintain that space-time, an emergent
property of all things, cannot change. There is nothing respect to which space-time
might change. Irreversible processes are represented by asymmetries in the foliation
of the manifold that provides a model for space-time. Space-time can be modeled
because is part of the physical reality, like any other relational property. Time does
not flow. It cannot flow because it is not a thing. Time does not go by. We do.
Appendix
1. Events
In what follows I shall provide a more rigorous characterization of the fundamental
concept of event.
The concept of individual is the basic primitive concept of any ontological
theory. I follow Bunge (1977) on the basics of the ontological views presented here.
Individuals associate themselves with other individuals to yield new individuals. It
follows that they satisfy a calculus, and that they are rigorously characterized only
through the laws of such a calculus. These laws are set with the aim of reproducing
the way real things associate. Specifically, it is postulated that every individual is
an element of a set s in such a way that the structure S = 〈s, ◦,〉 is a commutative
monoid of idempotents. This is a simple additive semi-group with neutral element.
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In the structure S, s is the set of all individuals, the element  ∈ s is a
fiction called the null individual, and the binary operation ◦ is the association of
individuals. Although S is a mathematical entity, the elements of s are not, with
the only exception of , which is a fiction introduced to form a calculus. The
association of any element of s with  yields the same element. The following
definitions characterize the composition of individuals.
1. x ∈ s is composed ⇔ (∃y, z)s (x = y ◦ z)
2. x ∈ s is simple ⇔ ∼ (∃y, z)s (x = y ◦ z)
3. x ⊂ y ⇔ x ◦ y = y (x is part of y ⇔ x ◦ y = y)
4. Comp(x) ≡ {y ∈ s | y ⊂ x} is the composition of x.
An individual with its properties make up a thing X:
X =< x, P (x) >
Here P (x) is the collection of properties of the individual x. A material thing is
an individual with material properties, i.e. properties that can change (see below)
in some respect.
Things are distinguished from abstract individuals because they have a number
of properties in addition to their capability of association. These properties can
be intrinsic (Pi) or relational (Pr). The intrinsic properties are inherent and they
are represented by predicates or unary applications, whereas relational properties
depend upon more than a single thing and are represented by n-ary predicates,
with n ≥ 1. Examples of intrinsic properties are electric charge and rest mass,
whereas velocity of macroscopic bodies and volume are relational properties. Ve-
locity (actually its modulus) is an intrinsic property only in the case of photons
and other bosons that move at the speed of light in any reference system.
The state of a thing X is a set of functions S(X) from a domain of reference
M (a set that can be enumerable or nondenumerable) to the set of properties PX .
Every function in S(X) represents a property in PX . The set of the physically
accessible states of a thing X is the lawful state space of X: SL(X). The state of
a thing is represented by a point in SL(X). A change of a thing is an ordered pair
of states. Only changing things can be material. Abstract things cannot change
since they have only one state (their properties are fixed by definition).
Finally, an event is a change of a thing X, i.e. an ordered pair of states:
(s1, s2) ∈ EL(X) = SL(X)× SL(X)
The space EL(X) is called the event space of X.
The Universe U is the composition of all things: (¬∃X)(X¬ ⊂ U). Space-time
is an emergent property of U (see Perez Bergliaffa et al. 1998 for details).
2. Presentism
Presentism, the doctrine advocated by Bunge, can be defined roughly like the
thesis that only the present is real. More precisely (see Crisp 2010):
Presentism. It is always the case that, for every x, x is present.
Parmenides reloaded 9
‘Present’ seems to refer to a given instant of time. Time is usually represented
by a 1D real continuum. Of course, the choice of the origin of coordinates when
we adopt a metric for time is conventional. Events signaled by different instants
are not. What event is present?. When is present?. The answer seems to be now.
‘Now’, as I have suggested elsewhere, seems to be a class of events that are related
to a given brain state (Romero 2011, see also Gru¨nbaum 1973). If this hypothesis
is correct, the ‘present’ is a construction of the brain based on its interaction with
a class of changing things that affects it. The ‘present’ is not a thing, that moves
from past to future. Every conscious brain process has its own present.
Some people think of the present as a kind of boundary between what existed
(and somehow is vanished) and what does not exist: the future. Things pop out
from nothing, exist during an unspecified span, and then vanish forever. This
violates what is perhaps the most basic principle of science, a principle introduced
by Parmenides: nothing comes out of nothing. Presentism implies that everything
comes out of nothing, all the time, and disappears into nothing after an indivisible
interval of time. Even Heraclitus, I venture, would be terrified.
Presentism is also incompatible with current physics. Let us consider two
events: I type this line (event e1), and a supernova explodes in the galaxy M83
(e2). These events can be considered simultaneous for some ‘observers’ (i.e. when
measured in some reference frame), or related by ‘e1 is earlier than e2’ in other
frame, or ‘e1 is later than e2’ in yet another frame. The fact is that both events
exist, be present or not for some people. Similarly, Parmenides exist in some region
of space-time, that covers Elea and part of Ancient Greece between, say, 515 and
450 BC. And for some time, he shared his present with Zeno. I exist beyond the
space-time region occupied by Parmenides. We shall never meet. But we both are
part of the same space-time. I feel lucky for that.
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